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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the potentially negative implications of
proposed antitrust legislation on the entrepreneurial ecosystem in
general, with a particular focus on the venture capitalists (VCs) that
fund it. First, it offers a review of how antitrust merger law currently
works and how proposed legislative changes to antitrust may threaten
the innovative Venture Capital (VC)-backed ecosystem that has made the
United States the center of global innovation across many different
industries. Accompanying this review are some empirical observations.
Second, recognizing that the understanding of innovative
entrepreneurial activity calls for a deep appreciation of those who back
it, the Article also provides an overview of the entrepreneurial ecosystem
and VCs’ motivations within this niche environment. In so doing, the
Article identifies the drivers of entrepreneurial innovation and explains
why changes to merger law may threaten these models of facilitating
innovative, growth-orientated entrepreneurs. Finally, the Article
concludes that changes to merger law may negatively affect the entire
entrepreneurial ecosystem and hinder innovation in the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Proposed antitrust legislation focused on regulating mergers
threatens the entrepreneurial ecosystem, a significant driver of
innovation.1 Several members of Congress have recently proposed
antitrust legislation which would change decades of antitrust practice
embraced by antitrust agencies and courts.2 These bills would alter
merger presumptions and burdens of proof in court and create outright
prohibitions for some mergers.3 This Article anticipates that additional

1.
See Jeff Farah, Restrictions on Acquisitions Would Stifle the US Startup
Ecosystem, Not Rein in Big Tech, TECHCRUNCH (May 19, 2021, 11:08 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2021/05/19/restrictions-on-acquisitions-would-stifle-the-us-startup-ecosystem-not-rein-in-big-tech/ [https://perma.cc/65FC-R9ML].
2.
See, e.g., Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, H.R. 3826, 117th Cong.
(2021); Tougher Enforcement Against Monopolies Act, S. 2039, 117th Cong. (2021); Bust Up Big
Tech Act, S. 1204, 117th Cong. (2021); Trust-Busting for the Twenty-First Century Act, S. 1074,
117th Cong. (2021); Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225, 117th
Cong. (2021).
3.
See H.R. 3826 § 2; S. 2039 § 202; S. 1204 § 2; S. 1074 §§ 3–4; S. 225 §§ 4, 9.
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antitrust legislation will be introduced covering the area of merger
enforcement.
Proposed legislation would affect horizontal mergers (e.g.,
Coca-Cola acquiring Pepsi) and non-horizontal mergers (e.g., Coca-Cola
acquiring a distributor or a data analytics company), which courts and
agencies have viewed as less problematic from a competition
perspective.4 The result is that certain potential merger deals will never
leave the boardroom, and others will be abandoned because the
possibility of antitrust intervention is too high from a risk perspective.5
Many economically-beneficial deals will be challenged under these
lower liability standards, with merging parties required to prove
efficiencies to overcome a presumption that the deal is anticompetitive.6
For certain industries and business models built upon acquisitions,
such as hardware, software, biotechnology, finance, and various
industrial applications, change will fundamentally alter the ability to
innovate.7
Altering this entrepreneurial ecosystem creates significant
barriers to innovation and reduces the incentives for firms to exit the
market via acquisition.8 The danger of the proposed legislative changes
is that these regulatory interventions may destroy entrepreneurial
value in terms of a firm’s financial value, as well as innovation (with
different forms of innovation described later in this Article) in the
economy more broadly.9
This Article addresses the potentially negative implications of
proposed antitrust legislation on the entrepreneurial ecosystem in
general and particularly focuses on the Venture Capitalists (VCs) that

4.
See generally 1 ANTITRUST SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Ch. 3 (8th ed. 2016) (describing developments in how courts and agencies view mergers); Roger D.
Blair, Christine S. Wilson, D. Daniel Sokol, Keith Klovers & Jeremy A. Sandford, Analyzing
Vertical Mergers: Accounting for the Unilateral Effects Tradeoff and Thinking Holistically About
Efficiencies, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 761 (2020) (discussing the development of vertical merger case
law as well as the economics of vertical mergers).
5.
See Farah, supra note 1.
6.
See id.; S. 225 §§ 4, 9; S. 1074 §§ 3–4.
7.
See D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357,
1362 (2018).
8.
See id.
9.
See James B. Bailey & Diana W. Thomas, Regulating Away Competition: The Effect of
Regulation on Entrepreneurship and Employment, 52 J. REGUL. ECON. 237, 238–40, 247 (2017). In
other settings, regulation has been found to destroy entrepreneurial value. See id.; see also Paul
Gompers, Will Gornall, Steven N. Kaplan & Ilya A. Strebulaev, How Venture Capitalists Make
Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2021, at 70, 72 (“[P]ublic companies that had received VC
backing accounted for 20% of the market capitalization and 44% of the research and development
spending of US public companies.”) [hereinafter How Venture Capitalists Make Decisions].
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fund it. First, it offers a review of how antitrust merger law currently
works and how proposed legislative changes to antitrust may threaten
the innovation in the Venture Capital (VC)-backed ecosystem that has
made the United States the center of global innovation across many
different industries. Accompanying this review are some empirical
observations. Second, recognizing that understanding innovative
entrepreneurial activity calls for a deep appreciation of those who back
it, the Article provides an overview of the entrepreneurial ecosystem
and the motivations of VCs. In so doing, it identifies the drivers of
entrepreneurial innovation and explains why changes to merger law
may threaten these models of facilitating innovative, growth-orientated
entrepreneurs. Lastly, the Article concludes that changes to merger law
may have negative effects on the entire entrepreneurial ecosystem and
hinder US innovation.
II. ANTITRUST MERGER LAW
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, plaintiffs (whether
government or private parties)10 can enjoin a merger that may result in
anticompetitive effects.11 Case law interpreting Section 7, as well as
both Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) establish the
parameters of merger law based on economic analyses of a particular
transaction.12 Recently, the DOJ and FTC promulgated Vertical Merger
Guidelines (VMG), which adopt a similar economics-based approach,13
although the FTC, but not the DOJ, recently withdrew the VMG.14
This Article focuses on an analysis of antitrust case law, as the
proposed legislation seeks to override long-standing cases.15 Courts in

10.
11.
12.

See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
See id.; United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362–63 (1963).
See DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 2–6 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2Y8-Y2MG].
13.
See DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 3 (2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/389KH8FP]; Blair et al., supra note 4, at 761, 765, 772, 784, 796.
14.
See Federal Trade Commission Withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines and
Commentary, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/federal-trade-commission-withdraws-vertical-merger-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/Y8WM-ULV4].
15.
See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225, 117th Cong. § 9 (2021).
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the United States use the burden-shifting framework first articulated
in United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,16 for horizontal mergers.17 This
framework was first applied to vertical mergers in United States v.
AT&T, Inc.18 In prior merger cases, as far back as, Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, the Supreme Court has held that “the government must
show that the proposed merger is likely to substantially lessen
competition, which encompasses a concept of ‘reasonable probability.’”19
As part of this burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden to establish a prima facie case that the merger is
anticompetitive.20 As courts recognize, “[t]o establish a prima facie case,
the Government must (1) propose the proper relevant market and (2)
show that the effect of the merger in that market is likely to be
anticompetitive.”21
If the plaintiff meets this prima facie burden, the defendants
may rebut by providing “sufficient evidence that the prima facie
case ‘inaccurately predicts the transaction’s probable effect on
competition.’”22 This stage in the burden shift is, for example, where
defendants address and substantiate potential efficiencies for the
transaction and cast doubt on potential anticompetitive harms that
would result from the merger.23 If the defendant can successfully rebut
the prima facie case, the burden of production shifts back to the
plaintiff.24

16.
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 982–83.
17.
See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Sanford Health, 926 F.3d 959, 962–63 (8th Cir. 2019).
18.
See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 190–91 (D.D.C. 2018).
19.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962); United States v.
AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.D.C. 2019).
20.
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 982.
21.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 337–38 (3d Cir.
2016). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure,
and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018) (discussing how the burdens work in practice and
their current limitations).
22.
Anthem, 855 F.3d at 349 (quoting Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991).
23.
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991; United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36,
89 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 30 (2010)) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims
. . . .”).
24.
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 983 (“If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption,
the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and
merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.”).
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This burden-shifting framework would change under a number
of current legislative proposals.25 For example, Senator Klobuchar’s
proposed legislation, the Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement
Reform Act of 2021 (CALERA), would change the current legal standard
in two ways.26 First, it would replace the “substantially lessen
competition” standard under Section 7 of the Clayton Act (such as the
elimination of competition between two firms) and create in its place an
“appreciable risk of materially lessening competition” standard.27 In
this new standard, the bill defines “materially” as “more than a de
minimus [sic] amount.”28 This would be a lower standard for the
government to meet under the current framework.29 Indeed, most
mergers would seem to be captured under such a standard because
“more than a de minimus [sic] amount” is such a low threshold.30
Further, for a significant portion of these transactions, Senator
Klobuchar’s proposed bill would shift the burden onto the merging
parties to overcome a presumption of anticompetitive effects because of
the relatively easy burden for the government to meet.31 This, in turn,
shifts the burden to the merging parties to prove pro-competitive
effects, thus increasing the deal cost for most mergers that do not have
actual anticompetitive effects.32 Mergers that fall within the following
categories would be required to meet the standard for proving a
transaction’s efficiency:
1. Mergers that significantly increase market concentration;
2. Mega-mergers valued at more than $5 billion;
3. Acquisitions of competitors or nascent competitors by a
dominant firm (where the bill defines dominance as a 50%
market share or possession of significant market power); and
4. Any acquisition valued over $50 million by a company valued
at or more than $100 billion in market capitalization.33

25.
See, e.g., Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225,
117th Cong. §§ 4, 9 (2021).
26.
See id.
27.
Id. § 4.
28.
Id.
29.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting mergers that would substantially lessen
competition), with S. 225 § 4 (prohibiting mergers that would create an appreciable risk of
lessening competition).
30.
See S. 225 § 4.
31.
See id. § 9.
32.
See id.
33.
Id. § 4.
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Senator Hawley’s bill (the Trust-Busting for the
Twenty-First-Century Act) would also prohibit mergers by companies
with a market capitalization greater than $100 billion, make
acquisitions by a “dominant digital firm” valued at over $1 million
presumptively unfair, and remove the agency presumption that vertical
mergers are typically not anticompetitive.34
The Authors are particularly concerned about the “acquisitions
of . . . nascent-competitors” language because of the potential chilling
effect it may have on the VC ecosystem.35 The change would make it
more difficult for entrepreneurs and VCs to reap the rewards of a
successful exit through an acquisition by another firm, as discussed in
Part III.36 Additionally, the Authors are concerned that many
acquisitions of VC-funded startups surpass the $50 million threshold
while not necessarily rising to the level of a “mega-merger.”37 As Part
III illustrates, changing the current entrepreneurial ecosystem may
have significant negative consequences.38 This ecosystem largely relies
upon exit through acquisition to maintain its vitality—which founders
and investors want in order to have an opportunity to reap a financial
return.39 The proposed legislation by Senators Klobuchar and Hawley
would significantly limit such acquisitions.40

34.
Trust-Busting for the Twenty-First Century Act, S. 1074, 117th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2021).
35.
See S. 225 § 4; Farah, supra note 1.
36.
See Farah, supra note 1.
37.
See infra Figure 6.
38.
See infra Part III.
39.
See Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or
Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Antitrust,
Competition Pol’y, and Consumer Rts. Of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 5 (2019)
[hereinafter Competition in Digital Technology Markets] (statement of Patricia Nakache, General
Partner, Trinity Ventures) (“If the government makes it more challenging for incumbents to
acquire these companies, this will have the devastating effect of making it less attractive to launch
a new enterprise and for people like myself to fund and partner with those companies. The end
result will be harm to the American innovation economy.”); see also Darian M. Ibrahim, The New
Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“The success of venture capital depends on
the ability of venture capitalists (“VCs”) to exit their investments by taking the start-ups they fund
public or selling them to a large company.”).
40.
See Farah, supra note 1.
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III. WHY DOES EXIT VIA ACQUISITION MATTER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP?
The ability to realize returns on investment and effort,
commonly referred to as “exit” from entrepreneurial ventures, is
important for both investors and founders.41 Without the ability to exit
via acquisition, neither founders nor investors would be able to reap the
gains of a business’ appreciation in value.42 And without appropriate
incentives to form new businesses (because the proposed legislation
may foreclose many mergers and acquisitions (M&A) exits), the
incentives for founding and growing a business decrease.43 When
potential acquirers can no longer make bids for such VC-backed
startups and acquisitions disappear or may be significantly diminished,
the prospect of VCs making necessary returns on their investment
decreases.44 Further, limited partners are less willing to invest in VCs.45
It is important to explore the structure of the entrepreneurial
ecosystem since the tech boom of the late 1990s to explain this adverse
scenario.46 The nature of most entrepreneurial exits is different in the
current post-Great Recession financial ecosystem compared to the late
1990s.47 In the late 1990s, the focus in the business press regarding
entrepreneurial exits was on initial public offerings (IPOs).48

41.
See Ji Youn (Rose) Kim & Haemin Dennis Park, Two Faces of Early Corporate Venture
Capital Funding: Promoting Innovation and Inhibiting IPOs, 2 STRATEGY SCI. 161, 163–64 (2017);
Dawn R. DeTienne, Alexander McKelvie & Gaylen N. Chandler, Making Sense of Entrepreneurial
Exit Strategies: A Typology and Test, 30 J. BUS. VENTURING 255, 256–57 (2015); Ibrahim, supra
note 39, at 11–12.
42.
See Sokol, supra note 7.
43.
See id. There is also an important “recycling effect” for VC investors. Farah, supra
note 1. VC-backed entrepreneurs who sell companies often go on to found new companies, or
become angels or VCs and invest in other companies. Id. Money based on exits often get redeployed
into new endeavors, which propels innovation. Id.
44.
See Competition in Digital Technology Markets Competition in Digital Technology
Markets, supra note 39, at 5–7; Farah, supra note 1.
45.
See Tomer Dean, The Meeting that Showed Me the Truth About VCs, TECHCRUNCH
(June 1, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/01/the-meeting-that-showed-me-thetruth-about-vcs/ [https://perma.cc/BN35-UW3K]. The article offers more discussion of limited
partners and their relationship with venture capitalists in Part IV. See infra Part IV.
46.
See Timothy B. Lee, 4 Charts that Show How Today’s Tech Boom Is Different from the
1990s, VOX (Aug. 19, 2015, 3:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/8/19/9178837/ipo-decline-microsoft-facebook [https://perma.cc/C54M-JKAY].
47.
See id.
48.
See id.
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Entrepreneurial exits in the current post-Great Recession era
are largely a function of acquisitions rather than IPOs.49 Perhaps more
importantly, the reality is that most exits are not based on IPOs at all
but on acquisitions.50 Indeed, a recent study suggests that 58 percent of
US startup founders and executives expect to be acquired.51 This Article
explores the development of the modern entrepreneurial ecosystem in
greater detail in Part IV.52
There are many reasons why larger firms acquire smaller firms,
but the primary motivation is that the nascent firm will allow the
acquiring firm to create efficiencies that otherwise would not be possible
merely by utilizing various strategies short of a merger, such as
bilateral contracts (integration via contract), strategic alliances, or joint
ventures.53 Because the target firm is often a strategic complement to
the acquiring firm, the merger may reduce transaction costs and
asymmetric risk.54 The merger may also enable learning by doing,
encourage knowledge transfers, reduce information leakages, improve
investment coordination, or create research and development
synergies.55 It is also important to adapt quickly to competitive threats
from other larger firms (e.g., adding new products or features through
acquisition can be less costly and time-consuming compared to
build-outs from scratch).56 In Part VI, this Article explores the
importance of complementary assets in greater detail.57
Both large and small firms bring different potential value to a
merger;58 this Article provides a number of such value-creation
justifications. One justification for a merger is that the acquirer and

49.
See Xiahoui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1663 (2012); Ibrahim, supra note 39, at 11–12; Farah,
supra note 1.
50.
See infra Figure 1.
51.
SILICON VALLEY BANK, 2020 GLOBAL STARTUP OUTLOOK 7 (2020),
https://www.svb.com/globalassets/library/uploadedfiles/content/trends_and_insights/reports/startup_outlook_report/suo_global_report_2020-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AHT-BNM8].
The survey did not ask the basis for this view. See id.
52.
See infra Part IV.
53.
See generally Jaideep Shenoy, An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and
Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers, 58 MGMT. SCI. 1482 (2012) (explaining the rationales
behind vertical mergers).
54.
See Sokol, supra note 7, at 1372.
55.
Blair et al., supra note 4, at 776–80.
56.
See Louis Kaplow, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 557, 581–84
(2021).
57.
See infra Section VI.B.
58.
See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 56, at 576–84.
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acquired firms have different strengths.59 The value of the larger
acquiring firm includes scale and scope efficiencies.60 Such efficiencies
allow for better investment and marketing of the acquired firm’s assets
through integration with the larger acquiring firm.61 Further, the very
process of integration may introduce increased process innovation into
the acquired firm.62 Various routines and processes allow the larger
firm to integrate the acquired firm in order to reduce search and
information costs.63
Smaller companies also win from being acquired.64 These types
of acquisitions allow VCs and founders to exit the opportunity at
valuations of multiples of the investment.65 Given uncertainties in
scaling up, exit through an acquisition allows the smaller firm a viable
exit strategy that benefits both founders and investors.66
Finally, entrepreneurial exit via merger provides an important
signaling mechanism to the market.67 When larger publicly traded
companies acquire smaller companies, the market incorporates the
information into the pricing of other deals.68 Increased transparency in
deals allows for more accurate pricing and entrepreneurial financing
rounds because there are additional similar deals to those acquisitions
by prominent tech firms.69 These deals aid in accurately pricing other
proposed deals by creating comparable benchmarks.70 For example, it
is easier to value real estate if there are similar transactions where the
closing price is publicly available; they offer a related context for how

59.
See id. at 581–84.
60.
See id. at 576–84.
61.
See id.
62.
See Bruno Cassiman, Massimo G. Colombo, Paola Garrone & Reinhilde Veugelers,
The Impact of M&A on the R&D Process: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Technological- and
Market-Relatedness, 34 RSCH. POL’Y 195, 196 (2005).
63.
See Gautam Ahuja & Riitta Katila, Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197, 200 (2001).
64.
See Sokol, supra note 7, at 1374.
65.
See id. at 1362.
66.
See id. at 1374. (“One might imagine that the entrepreneurial firm may position itself
so that it is rational to be vertically acquired. It, in fact, may base its business model on such an
acquisition. The objective of the entrepreneurial firm is to create a bidding war for its specialized
assets among potential acquirers.”).
67.
See ROBERT J. RHEE, CORPORATE FINANCE 112–13 (2016).
68.
See id. (“In M&A deals, transaction comparables, which are multiples of transaction
price, are also considered along with data on merger premiums.”)
69.
See id.
70.
See Paul Gompers, Anna Kovner, Josh Lerner & David Scharfstein, Venture Capital
Investment Cycles: The Impact of Public Markets, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 10–11 (2008).
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pricing works.71 These motivations for why acquisitions occur should be
put into context of entrepreneurial activity overall and the VCs’ model.
IV. A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE BUSINESS MODEL OF VENTURE
CAPITAL INVESTORS
VC is independently managed, dedicated capital, which focuses
on equity or equity-linked investments in privately held, high-growth
companies.72 Typically, these funds are raised from institutional and
wealthy individual investors through partnerships and exist only for a
finite, ten-year period.73 These funds invest in young firms, usually in
exchange for preferred stock with various special privileges.74 VCs sell
these firms to corporate acquirers or liquidate their holdings after
taking the firms public or selling their interests.75
VC funds have a notable impact on innovation.76 Academic work
suggests that VCs have stimulated innovation by backing
entrepreneurial technology-based ventures.77 For example, the influx of
capital into VC funds during the decade following the 1978 “prudent
man” change in pension fund rules has been associated with increases
in VC investments and subsequent patenting rates.78 Similar evidence

71.
See
The
Sales
Comparison
Approach
to
Real
Estate
Valuation,
PROPERTYMETRICS (July 23, 2019), https://propertymetrics.com/blog/sales-comparison-approach/
[https://perma.cc/JKD6-NE77].
72.
See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSHUA LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 4–10 (2004)
[hereinafter VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE]. Other sources of entrepreneurial finance often include
corporate VC funds, crowdfunding platforms and startup accelerators. For an overview, see Will
Drover, Lowell Busenitz, Sharon Matusik, David Townsend, Aaron Anglin & Gary Dushnitsky, A
Review and Roadmap of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate
Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and Accelerators, 43 J. MGMT. 1820, 1843
(2017).
73.
See VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE, supra note 72, at 5.
74.
JOSH LERNER, ANN LEAMON & FELDA HARDYMON, VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE
EQUITY, AND THE FINANCING OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 56–64, 121–38 (2012).
75.
Bronwyn H. Hall & Josh Lerner, The Financing of R&D and Innovation, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 609, 627–28 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan
Rosenberg eds., 2010).
76.
Roberta Dessí & Nina Yin, The Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 668, 668–69 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012).
77.
See id. at 668 (“There is evidence of a substantial impact of venture capital on
innovation, measured by patent counts, at the industry level (at least for the United States).”).
78.
See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.); Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation, 31
RAND J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000).
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of VC-driven innovation has been documented in Europe.79 A recent
analysis of patenting outcomes in the United States during the
1976–2017 period finds that VC-backed ventures were between two and
four times as likely to have impactful patents as calculated by various
measures, including citations, originality, generality, and closeness to
science.80 Relatedly, another work illustrates that as the accessibility of
VCs to a specific region increases, the innovation and financial
outcomes of the entrepreneurial ventures that VCs backed in the region
rise too.81
The impact of VC investment on patents and innovation is also
reflected in VC-backed companies’ commitments to research and
development (R&D) activities.82 A recent study compared the
performance of VC-backed companies that were publicly listed as of the
end of 2019 to other publicly listed companies that were not
VC-backed.83 While the two groups of companies are similar in terms of
aggregate levels of revenues and profits, the former group accounts for
the lion’s share (89 percent) of the recorded R&D expenditures that
year.84 Taken together, these patterns in VC patenting and R&D
highlight the role of VC in stimulating novel technologies over the span
of many decades.85 For example, VC funding stimulated semiconductor
and mainframe computing ventures in the 1960s,86 pioneering
biotechnology ventures in the 1980s,87 internet and e-commerce
innovators in the 1990s,88 and a host of novel services and business
models over the 2010s.89

79.
See Ana Faria & Natália Barbosa, Does Venture Capital Really Foster Innovation?,
122 ECON. LETTERS 129, 130 (2014).
80.
Sabrina T. Howell, Josh Lerner, Ramana Nanda & Richard R. Townsend, Financial
Distancing: How Venture Capital Follows the Economy Down and Curtails Innovation 16 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27150, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27150/revisions/w27150.rev0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L6A-V3F4].
81.
See Shai Bernstein, Xavier Giroud & Richard R. Townsend, The Impact of Venture
Capital Monitoring, 71 J. FIN. 1591, 1592 (2016).
82.
See Josh Lerner & Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation:
What We Know and How Much We Still Need to Learn, 34 J. ECON. PERSPS. 237, 241 (2020).
83.
Id. at 240.
84.
Id.
85.
See Dessí & Yin, supra note 76, at 670–74.
86.
Lerner & Nanda, supra note 82.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
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The funding to support and stimulate entrepreneurial activity
often originates from VC investors.90 Therefore, it is important to
understand VC structures and objectives in order to recognize how VCs
support innovative ventures. Typically, a VC firm will create a Limited
Partnership with the investors as limited partners (LPs) and the firm
itself as the General Partner.91 Examples of LPs include public pension
funds, corporate pension funds, insurance companies, family offices,
university endowments, and foundations.92
The basic structure of a VC fund is as follows. A new fund is
established when the VC firm obtains necessary commitments from its
investors, for example, $100 million.93 A fund is usually structured as a
closed-end fund with a duration of eight to ten years, at the end of which
the capital and any applicable gains are returned to the LPs.94 During
the first few years, the venture firm seeks out and invests in innovative
startups and spends the remaining years working with the founders to
grow their ventures.95 The ultimate payoff to the founders, LPs, and
VCs is in the form of a “liquidity event,” (also known as an “exit”)where
shareholders can turn their equity stake into cash either when the
venture is acquired or goes public.96 Fewer mergers mean fewer
opportunities for a liquidity event.
A closer look at liquidity events, since the Great Recession, offers
complementary insights. First, there has been growth in the number of
liquidity events over the past fifteen years, partially reflecting the
overall increase in investment activity during that time period.97
Moreover, the number of M&A deals significantly exceeds that of IPOs

90.
See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003).
91.
See id. at 1070–71.
92.
Id. at 1070.
93.
See Venture Capital Fund, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/venture-capital-fund/ [https://perma.cc/T6BX-EQ3Z] (last
visited Dec. 22, 2021).
94.
See Pocket Sun, Venture Capital 101: Structure, Returns, Exit and Beyond, MEDIUM:
SOGAL (June 30, 2015), https://medium.com/sogal-adventures/venture-capital-101-structure-returns-exit-and-beyond-2048f22247a5 [https://perma.cc/PLD7-PCZE].
95.
See Adam Hayes, Venture Capital, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/venturecapital.asp [https://perma.cc/FK7J-MG3L].
96.
See Adam Hayes, Liquidity Event, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity_event.asp [https://perma.cc/BRE2-Y96P] [hereinafter Liquidity
Event]; infra Part VI. See generally ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL AND
THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 3–122 (2d ed. 2010) (providing an overview of VC firms, funds, and
investors with an emphasis on their respective financial interests).
97.
See infra Figure 1.
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each year.98 In any given year, there are at least five times more M&A
events than there are IPOs.99 While less frequent, IPOs tend to take
place at higher valuations, with the average IPO valuation hovering
around $500 million and peaking at above $2 billion more recently.100
Conversely, average M&A activity involves much lower valuations.101
Insights into the frequency and valuations at different liquidity events
are developed in Part VI and Figures 5 and 6.102
Figure 1: Venture Capital Common Paths to Liquidity103

The compensation and longevity of VCs govern their success.104
The compensation of a VC fund is usually comprised of two parts: an
annual management fee (often 2 percent of assets under management)
and carried interest (broadly speaking, about 20 percent of the returns
generated on assets under management).105 A VC’s longevity and ability
to launch subsequent funds significantly shape its success.106 The VC
firm is likely to raise several funds; as each fund approaches its

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Part VI; Figures 5, 6.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, PITCHBOOK-NVCA VENTURE
MONITOR (2021), https://nvca.org/research/pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor/
[https://perma.cc/G3LC-LCN3] (select “Download the XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “Exits x Type” tab). Additional analysis provided by the authors.
104.
See Sun, supra note 94.
105.
See id.
106.
See id.
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predetermined end date, the firm engages in fundraising for its
subsequent fund.107
The public listing of a portfolio company (a company in which a
VC holds an interest) represents a successful event for the VCs who
funded it:108 not only do they stand to profit through their carried
interest in the current VC fund, but they have also increased the
likelihood of securing LP commitments for the next fund.109 At the same
time, IPOs are less common than M&A events,110 and although the
latter usually take place at lower valuations, they may represent a
substantial return on assets under management for smaller VC
funds.111
This primer on VCs helps explain the current phase of
entrepreneurial activity in the United States since the Great Recession,
which Part V explores.112
V. VC-BACKED ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY IS AT A RECORD HIGH
Entrepreneurial growth plays a significant role in US innovation
in terms of new ideas which can be commercialized.113 For this analysis,
we focus on VC-backed, technology-based entrepreneurship, which
requires the appropriate mix of legal institutions, capital, and ideas.114
When the mix of legal institutions creates certain barriers to
entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial investment and innovation suffer
because of the increased uncertainty of reaping investment rewards and
blocking certain exit opportunities.115 In short, if mergers become more

107.
See id.
108.
See Venture Capital Fund, supra note 93. Because VC funds are limited in duration,
VCs seek to maximize their investments during the life of the fund. See Drover et al., supra note
72, at 1821. VCs have a choice of exit via IPO or acquisition. Id. In principle, the motivation
between the two is the same, namely, to maximize returns for the investors of each IPO fund. See
id. Hence, one form of exit is not superior to the other. Both are merely vehicles to achieving
returns for VC investors. See id.
109.
See Jason Fernando, Initial Public Offering (IPO), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp [https://perma.cc/XQQ6-PL3M].
110.
See supra Figure 1.
111.
See supra Figure 1.
112.
See infra Part V.
113.
See Gilson, supra note 90, at 1068.
114.
See id. See generally Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 289 (1999) (providing an overview of the economic foundation of high-tech start-ups).
115.
See Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud & John Van Reenen, The Impact of Regulation
on Innovation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28381, 2021),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28381/w28381.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8X2PZABC].
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difficult, limited exit via mergers cannot be shifted through more
IPOs.116 This displacement also cannot be overcome by organic internal
R&D growth (at least not of the same type that focuses on high-risk
innovation). Rather, there would be less innovation and investment.117
The Authors detail the reasons herein, but first, the question of what
might happen as a result of changes in merger law is a question best
understood when applied to the current environment of entrepreneurial
growth in the United States.
First, the Authors identify the current trends in new startups.
The US-entrepreneurial ecosystem has risen to new heights since
the end of the Great Recession.118 As the chart below shows,
entrepreneurship, with a system of larger companies acquiring smaller
ones as the most common form of exit, exhibits significant growth in the
number of startups founded since the financial crisis.119
In Table 1, the Authors provide data with regard to both the
number of deals and deal value in the United States on an annual basis
from 2006 to 2020.120 The Authors further break down the data into
different stages of investment―angel and seed investment, early-stage
VC, and later-stage VC.121 A number of factors drive these investment
decisions.122 They include, among others, technological advancement
(technology), disruption to business models and organizational
structures and routines (strategy), employment opportunities
(economics), and the increasing focus on sustainability, diversity, and
overall societal impact (social).123

116.
See id.
117.
See id.
118.
See infra Table 1.
119.
See infra Table 1.
120.
See infra Table 1.
121.
See infra Table 1.
122.
See Paul A. Gompers, Josh Lerner, Margaret M. Blair & Thomas Hellman, What
Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 149, 150–52
(1998).
123.
See id.; VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE, supra note 72, at 127–28.

2022]

ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY

271

Table 1: Startup Snapshot in the United States 2006-2020124

Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of the data in Table 1.125
It charts both deal count and value over time from 2006 to 2020.126
Figure 2: Startup Deal Value and Deal Count in the
United States 2006-2020127

The X-axis denotes the calendar year. The left (bar plots) and
right (line plot) Y-axes represent the aggregate dollar amount ($B) and
the number of deals, respectively.128

124.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the
XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “Deal Activity” tab). Additional analysis provided by the
authors.
125.
See infra Figure 2; supra Table 1.
126.
See infra Figure 2.
127.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the
XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “Deal Activity” tab). Additional analysis provided by the
authors.
128.

See id.

272

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:2:255

VI. THE CATAPULT-ERS: DRIVING ENTREPRENEURIAL INNOVATION AT
SCALE
What has caused the rapid expansion in entrepreneurial
activity? Based on an examination of the academic literature,
this Article identifies two drivers―the two “Cs”—that catapult
entrepreneurial capital forward: (1) Capital and (2) Complementary
assets. These two drivers have been missing from the antitrust debate.
A. Capital
VC funds finance innovative ventures to monetize their proceeds
and deliver returns to their LPs.129 The ultimate payoff to the founders,
LPs, and VCs is in the form of a “liquidity event,” which enables
shareholders to turn their equity stakes into cash when the venture is
acquired or goes public.130 It follows that the health of the VC model and
the model’s support of innovative ventures is largely contingent on the
health of the market for liquidity events.131 As noted above, VCs’ ability
to monetize their portfolio companies is key to their compensation and
longevity.132
An extensive survey of VCs conducted during the first half of the
previous decade reveals that about a third of the ventures they funded
are outright failures, about half are acquired, and 15 percent go
public.133 The analysis further notes that the acquisitions are usually at
valuations that are substantially lower than IPO valuations, and some
are “disguised failures” in the sense that they do not return the
risk-adjusted investment amount.134
1. Going Public is One Source of Liquidity Events
Figure 3 records historical patterns of IPO activity from 1980
through 2020.135 It highlights a stark change in this important liquidity
event: the number of IPOs grew dramatically through 2000, suffered a

129.
See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Money Chasing Deals? The Impact of Fund Inflows
on Private Equity Valuation, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 281, 285 (2000).
130.
See Liquidity Event, supra note 96.
131.
See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A
Survey, 17 EUR. FIN. MGMT., 619, 628 (2011).
132.
See generally Part IV (explaining how the longevity of a VC depends on its ability to
monetize its portfolio companies).
133.
See How Venture Capitalists Make Decisions, supra note 9, at 185.
134.
See id. at 185–86.
135.
See infra Figure 3.
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precipitous drop coinciding with the burst of the dot-com bubble, and
has remained low ever since.136 Moreover, the age of companies at IPO
also changed pre-and post-2000.137 Whereas the average age of a
company at IPO was eight years during the period leading up to the
year 2000—the average age is usually over ten years for post-2000
IPOs.138
There are several reasons for the marked change in the
frequency and nature of IPOs over the past few decades.139 A few
explanations suggest a problem of regulatory overreach, specifically
overly burdensome compliance costs.140 The first explanation concerns
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).141 Section 404 of SOX imposes
additional compliance costs on publicly traded firms.142 These costs
have been especially onerous for small firms because they constitute a
large fraction of IPO proceeds.143 The second explanation underscores
another impact of SOX, the decline in the number of underwriters that
provide analyst coverage of smaller firms.144 There are various other
explanations regarding the decline in IPOs.145 One focuses on the SEC’s
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 and the 2003 Global
Settlement as sources of the decline.146 Another explanation is that in
recent years, a large fraction of the “public” exits were in the form of
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).147 Finally, mergers
may be a priority because it takes a longer amount of time to reach IPO
maturity, and some investors need an early payoff because their time

136.
See infra Figure 3.
137.
See infra Figure 3.
138.
See infra Figure 3.
139.
See infra text accompanying notes 141–47.
140.
See infra text accompanying notes 141–47.
141.
See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
142.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404; Kimberly Krawiec, Let’s Talk: What FinReg Can Learn
from New Governance (and Vice Versa), 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1241, 1243 (2019) (“These
requirements have significantly increased firms’ costs of internal controls.”).
143.
See Gao et al., supra note 49, at 1664.
144.
See id.
145.
See infra text accompanying notes 145–47.
146.
See Gao et al., supra note 49; Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Woojin Kim, Do Analysts
Herd? An Analysis of Recommendations and Market Reactions. 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 901,
911–12 (2010); David Weild, How to Revive Small-Cap IPOs, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203554104577001522344390902 [https://perma.cc/5S7E-JEL3] (Oct. 27,
2011, 9:22 PM).
147.
See Anna-Louise Jackson & Benjamin Curry, Special Purpose Acquisition Company:
What Is a SPAC?, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2021, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/spacspecial-purpose-aquisition-company/ [https://perma.cc/YN89-Q3YG].
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horizons are a function of when their fund closes.148 Hence, the M&A
route remains a viable exit window.149 This may be particularly
important for first-time managers or those who back non-traditional
companies.150
Figure 3 provides historical IPO numbers and the median age of
the firm at IPO.
Figure 3: Historical IPO Numbers (and Median Age at IPO)151

Although the number of IPOs has been significantly lower over
the past couple of decades, it is still the case that some innovative
ventures follow this route and list on public markets.152 Two
observations follow: the first is that there are more diverse routes to
public markets, including the traditional IPO route, direct listing, and

148.
See Tom Huddleston, Jr., What is a SPAC? Explaining One of Wall Street’s Hottest
Trends, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/30/what-is-a-spac.html [https://perma.cc/P3GCNZUA] (Feb. 23, 2021, 11:13 PM).
149.
See Ben Boissevain, How to Prepare for M&A, Your Most Likely Exit Avenue,
TECHCRUNCH (July 26, 2021, 2:09 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2021/07/26/how-to-prepare-for-mayour-most-likely-exit-avenue/ [https://perma.cc/HHT4-8PXG].
150.
See Bill Carlino, Why the Spike in Non-Traditional Firm Mergers?, ACCT. WEB (Nov.
17, 2017), https://www.accountingweb.com/practice/growth/why-the-spike-in-non-traditionalfirm-mergers [https://perma.cc/9PDQ-WXJ8].
151.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the
XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “Deal Activity” and “Exit Medians and Avg” tabs). Additional
analysis and data provided by the authors.
152.
See Ari Levy, Three of the 10 Biggest Tech IPOs Have Happened in 2020—Including
Two in the Last Week, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/12/10-biggest-tech-ipos-ever-three-in2020-two-last-week.html [https://perma.cc/X243-4ML8] (Dec. 12, 2020, 3:31 PM) (noting that the
largest tech IPOs have included Uber, Doordash, Lyft, Snowflake, Snap, and Airbnb).
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most recently, SPACs.153 Figure 4 records the dramatic rise in the
number and aggregate valuation supported under the latter
approach.154 Figure 4 also provides the number of exits and the amount
raised, as well as historical SPACs numbers and total amount raised.155
Table 2: SPAC Activity in the United States 2010-2020156

Figure 4: SPAC Activity in the United States 2010-2020157

Another observation is that the scale and value creation behind
many innovators that have gone public traces back to M&A activity,
some of which may be threatened by certain antitrust bills.158 Consider

153.
See Yunpeng (Patrick) Xiong, SPACs and Direct Listings: The Death Knell for
Traditional IPOs?, CALIF. L. REV. (Apr. 2021), https://www.californialawreview.org/spacs-anddirect-listings-the-death-knell-for-traditional-ipos [https://perma.cc/QLY3-NQMB].
154.
See infra Figure 4.
155.
See infra Figure 4.
156.
PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the XLS
Data Pack”; then navigate to the “SPAC Activity” tab).
157.
Id.
158.
See Jan Rybnicek, Op-Ed: Recent Antitrust Proposals Could ‘Throw Sand in the Gears’
of Economic Recovery by Stalling M&A, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/12/op-ed-recent-antitrust-proposals-add-friction-to-ma-at-wrong-time.html [https://perma.cc/N54Y-T4DR] (Feb. 12,
2021, 3:07 PM).
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the lodging innovator, Airbnb, which debuted on NASDAQ on
December 10, 2020.159 As illustrated by Figure 5, the company has
engaged in over a dozen acquisitions of companies in related spaces
during the decade leading up to its IPO,160 a trend that has high
significance.161 For example, Unity Software acquired over a dozen
companies before its September 2020 IPO, including the $53 million
acquisition of Artomatix (March 2020) and the $25 million acquisition
of Multiplay (November 2017).162 Similarly, the software company,
Palantir Technologies, engaged in about a half-dozen acquisitions
prior to its September 2020 IPO. The cloud-computing-based data
warehousing company, Snowflake Inc., also acquired Numeracy (March
2019) and CryptoNumerics (July 2020) before its IPO (September
2020).163Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of Airbnb’s M&A
investment history.164
Figure 5: Airbnb M&A and Investment History165

159.
See Lauren Feiner, Airbnb Skyrockets 112% in Public Market Debut, Giving It a Market Cap of $86.5 Billion, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/10/airbnb-ipo-abnb-starts-tradingon-the-nasdaq.html [https://perma.cc/N94N-EA9F] (Dec. 10, 2020, 7:57 PM).
160.
See infra Figure 5.
161.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 172.
162.
See Charlie Taylor, Unity Technologies to Create 100 Jobs After Completing
Artomatix Deal, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/unity-technologies-to-create-100-jobs-after-completing-artomatix-deal-1.4198666
[https://perma.cc/Y9M2-TMQX]; Dean Takahashi, Unity Buys Game’s Multiplay Game Server
Hosting Business for $25.2 Million, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:32 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/11/28/unity-buys-games-multiplay-game-server-hosting-business-for-25-2-million/
[https://perma.cc/WA2D-UJ9A].
163.
See Snowflake Investments & Acquisitions, PITCHBOOK, https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/61489-18 [https://perma.cc/76SS-PTDD] (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
164.
See infra Figure 5.
165.
Airbnb Strategy Teardown: Ahead of Potential IPO, Airbnb Looks Beyond The Hotel
Industry, CBINSIGHTS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/airbnb-strategyteardown-expert-intelligence/#acquisitions [https://perma.cc/4GXA-EEE4].
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2. Trade Sales
Acquisitions constitute the most common liquidity event for
VC-backed companies.166 Not only do acquisitions account for the
largest number of liquidity events, but they also cover a wide range of
exits at low and medium valuations.167 Figure 2 above and Figure 6
below offer insights into M&A activity over the past fifteen years.168 It
underscores that most exits are at a low valuation.169
To complement the discussion, the Authors touch below on the
role of M&A activity for VC funds. Figure 6 shows that M&A plays
a sizable role in entrepreneurial exits.170 There are numerous
explanations for the amount and impact of M&A activity over the past
decade.171 Abundant academic work explored the relationship between
M&A and innovation, often with conflicting findings.172 Extant
explanations range from the value-creating view, by which M&A is an
efficient way to realize economies of scope through value-destroying
arguments, to views whereby acquisitions are motivated by an attempt
to shelf the innovation of the acquired startup (i.e., a killer acquisition)
or stifle other startups from operating and innovating in the space (i.e.,
a kill zone).173 It is noteworthy that the latter arguments do not criticize
all M&A activity.174 For example, the work on killer acquisitions focuses
on the pharmaceutical industry, reporting that over 90 percent of the
M&A deals analyzed do not exhibit such a pattern.175 Case by case

166.
See Onur Bayar & Thomas J. Chemmanur, IPOs Versus Acquisitions and the
Valuation Premium Puzzle: A Theory of Exit Choice by Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists, 46
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1755, 1756 (2011).
167.
See supra Figure 2; infra Figure 6.
168.
See supra Figure 2; infra Figure 6.
169.
See supra Figure 2; infra Figure 6.
170.
See infra Figure 6.
171.
See infra note 172.
172.
Compare Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, R&D and the Incentives from Merger
and Acquisition Activity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 34, 71–72 (2013) (finding that smaller firms may
innovate more when they could potentially be acquired by larger firms), with Amit Seru, Firm
Boundaries Matter: Evidence from Conglomerates and R&D Activity, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 381, 402
(2014) (finding that firms acquired in conglomerate mergers, as measured by patent-based metrics,
produce a smaller number and less novel innovations).
173.
See Gao et al., supra note 49, at 165; Sai Krishna Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Kill Zone 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27146, 2021),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27146/w27146.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV9AAVYH]; Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions, 3 J. POL. ECON. 129,
129 (2021).
174.
See infra text accompanying notes 179.
175.
See Cunningham et al., supra note 173.
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antitrust analysis of particular deals allows for a more nuanced
approach to address particular potentially problematic deals in such
settings.176
Similarly, the recent work on kill zones focuses on multi-sided
software platforms.177 Even if taken in its most favorable light, this
work suggests the proposition is limited to M&A activity by two
software companies but does not characterize the universe of software
M&As.178 The empirical record on the types of acquisitions made, and
the impact therein, is still at a nascent stage; broad inferences cannot
be drawn except that antitrust and regulatory interventions should be
revisited given that some of these acquisitions may be value creating.179

176.
See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Law for Biotech and Killer Acquisitions, 72 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2020) (explaining that innovation is fact dependent).
177.
See Kamepalli et al., supra note 173, at 2.
178.
See id.
179.
See Milan Miric, Margherita Pagani & Omar A. El Sawy, When and Who Do Platform
Companies Acquire? Understanding the Role of Acquisitions in the Growth of Platform Companies,
45 MIS Q. 2159, 2174 (2021); Zhuoxin Li & Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand
Spillovers in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Facebook’s Integration of Instagram, 63
MGMT. SCI. 3138, 3139 (2017); Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and
Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 28–
29 (2007). See generally Blair et al., supra note 4 at 773–82 (discussing various efficiency rationales
for vertical mergers and mergers of complementary or adjacent products).
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Figure 6: M&A Activities by VC Funds180

The X-axis denotes the calendar year.181 The left Y-axis and area
plot represents the number of deals of each size bracket.182 Similarly,
the right Y-axis and bar plot represent the aggregate dollar amount
($M) of deals of each size bracket.183
B. Complementary Assets
Growth and successful commercialization often require more
than just money; they call for complementary assets.184 This includes
things such as manufacturing, regulatory expertise, marketing, and
distribution, which are typically held downstream in the firm’s value
chain.185 Startup success calls not only for the development of a novel
product or a service, but also for complementary assets that are key to
speeding and successfully introducing innovation in the market.186

180.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the
XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “Exit x Size” tab). Additional analysis and data provided by
the authors.
181.
See supra Figure 6.
182.
See supra Figure 6.
183.
See supra Figure 6.
184.
See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RSCH. POL’Y 285, 288–90 (1986).
185.
See id.
186.
Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the Market for “Ideas”: Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RSCH. POL’Y 333, 334–35 (2003).
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Numerous academic studies have demonstrated the role
complementary assets play in successfully commercializing
innovation.187 These studies range from the traditional typesetter
industry to biotechnology, and even the solar photovoltaic industry.188
The growth in the number of M&A deals and their fraction of all
liquidity events have been attributed to the need to speed and
strengthen commercialization efforts.189 The gradual decrease in the
number of small-company IPOs is consistent with the rise in scaling
efficiency through merging with an incumbent firm.190
The aforementioned argument holds specifically for specialized
complementary assets.191 Whereas generic complementary assets are
commodity-type assets available on the open market (and thus do not
endow their owners an advantage),192 specialized complementary assets
are frequently built over long periods and thus are path dependent and
often idiosyncratic.193 The property rights theory of the firm suggests
that when contracts are incomplete, the novel innovation and
complementary assets should be owned by the same firm to minimize

187.
See, e.g., Rahul Kapoor & Nathan R. Furr, Complementarities and Competition:
Unpacking the Drivers of Entrants’ Technology Choices in the Solar Photovoltaic Industry, 36
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 416 (2015) (using a complementary-assets framework to predict entrant’s
technology choices in an emerging industry); Gary P. Pisano, The Governance of Innovation:
Vertical Integration and Collaborative Arrangements in the Biotechnology Industry, 20 RSCH.
POL’Y 237 (1991) (analyzing the forward and backward integration between biotechnology firms
and industry firms like pharmaceutical companies); Mary Tripsas, Unraveling the Process of
Creative Destruction: Complementary Assets and Incumbent Survival in the Typesetter
Industry. 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 119 (1997) (arguing that appropriability through specialized
complementary assets is one of three major factors in the commercial success of incumbents versus
new industry entrants).
188.
See, e.g., Kapoor & Furr, supra note 187 (analyzing the solar photovoltaic industry);
Pisano, supra note 179 (primarily analyzing the biotechnology industry); Tripsas, supra note 185
(analyzing the typesetter industry).
189.
See Sokol, supra note 7, at 1373 (“In order to innovate, larger firms need to acquire
smaller firms to utilize the technology that the target firm possess. A number of reasons explain
this strategy of acquisition vis-à-vis internal growth. This includes lower entry barriers via
acquisition, acquisition of intellectual property and research and development (R&D) that can be
used strategically, knowledge, economies of scale and scope, and the ability to exert greater control
rights through vertical integration via merger rather than via contract.”).
190.
See Kaplow supra note 56, at 572–84.
191.
See Xiaoshu Bei, Trademarks, Specialized Complementary Assets, and the External
Sourcing of Innovation, RSCH. POL’Y, Nov. 2019, at 1, 1.
192.
See David Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509, 524–25 (1997).
193.
Id. at 523.

2022]

ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY

281

the negative effect of the hold-up problem.194 It follows that incumbent
firms, who possess complementary assets developed over years or
decades, offer an opportunity to speed time to market and profit from
entrepreneurial innovation.195
Acquisitions of nascent firms may allow the larger firm to
replenish its basic R&D with new approaches. This R&D replenishment
may be more difficult if a large firm tries to innovate itself.196 For
example, if a large firm was to try a high-risk but high-reward
innovation and spend $800 million on it, and if the return on investment
was zero, investors would punish the firm with a lower stock valuation
when the loss was announced.197 For this reason, such risky
undertakings are less likely to occur in large firms.198 In contrast, many
VC-backed firms take on exactly this sort of risk.199 Finally, because it
is likely easier to acquire a complementary asset rather than develop
it,200 it can become easier for an acquiring firm to be more competitive
vis-à-vis its competition.201 The proposed legislation makes
pro-competitive acquisitions by firms harder (there are limits on what
sorts of acquisitions may be undertaken) and more costly (because with
higher antitrust risk, one needs to spend more on lawyers and
economists to defend deals).202 This limitation on acquisitions also has
geopolitical implications if a market leader in a particular industry is a
non-US firm. The VC-based entrepreneurial environment is critical to
US-based companies remaining not just innovative,203 but more so
relative to rising non-US competitors where such limits may not be in
place.

194.
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990).
195.
Gatum Ahuja & Riittaa Katila, Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197, 198 (2001);
Elisa Alvarez-Garrido & Gary Dushnitsky, Are Entrepreneurial Venture’s Innovation Rates
Sensitive to Investor Complementary Assets? Comparing Biotech Ventures Backed by Corporate and
Independent VCs, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 819, 823–26 (2016).
196.
See Ahuja & Katila, supra note 195, at 198–200.
197.
See, e.g., Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky, supra note 195, at 830.
198.
See Sophia Kunthara, Risky Business: The Difference Between Private Equity and Venture Capital, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Oct. 18, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/risky-business-the-difference-between-private-equity-and-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/JG2X-PQHZ].
199.
See id.
200.
See Kaplow, supra note 56.
201.
See id.
202.
See supra Part II.
203.
See Kortum & Lerner, supra note 78, at 674.
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VII. MAINTAINING THE HEALTH OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEM
This Article has presented the discussion of liquidity events with
a focus on M&A activity through the lens of founders, acquirers, and
VCs, as well as their collective ability to deliver and benefit from
consistent innovation.204 As this is an important topic, one should
carefully take stock of the multiple issues at play, including some that
may have received less attention to date. The current discussion focuses
on the entrepreneurial ventures being acquired and the viability of
their innovation. Below, the Authors highlight a related view that has
received less attention to date. It concerns the health of the VC model
as a whole, shifting attention from specific ventures that are to be
acquired while taking a broader perspective that focuses on the VC
firms that fund those ventures and the firms’ ability to back other
innovative ventures. Limitations to M&A through antitrust legislation
hurt a number of traditional LPs investing in VC funds,205 such as
public pensions and universities,206 which use VC investment to
increase the returns on their assets for the reasons we outline below.
A. First-Time Funds
The view pertains specifically to first-time VC funds. Figure 7
reports the median fund size for first-time VCs and further compares it
to the median M&A size.207 Because the former is in the sub-$50 million
range,208 on average, such funds can be significantly sensitive to even a
single M&A deal, which falls in the $50 million-$100 million range.209
The “ratio” line in the figure divides the latter by the former and shows
that a single M&A deal represents, on average, a 2x return on the size
of a first-time fund.210 Moreover, as Figure 8 below illustrates, the time
to a liquidity event is usually faster under the M&A track (compared to
the IPO track).211 Taken together, these observations suggest that the

204.
See supra Part IV.
205.
See supra Part VI.
206.
See Gilson, supra note 90.
207.
See infra Figure 7. Increasingly, first time VCs include more diverse teams. See, e.g.,
Reanna Zuniga, 53 Black Founders and Investors to Watch in 2021, PITCHBOOK (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://pitchbook.com/blog/53-black-founders-and-investors-to-watch-in-2021
[https://perma.cc/JV3B-D442].
208.
See infra Figure 7.
209.
See infra Figure 7.
210.
To calculate the returns for a specific deal, one requires information on the equity
stakes of the VC fund. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 96, at 108.
211.
See infra Figure 8.
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viability of first-time funds is particularly sensitive to the market for
sub-$100 million M&As.212 One or two M&A deals can make a
substantial contribution to the compensation of a first-time fund.213
Crucially, it also plays an instrumental role in the longevity of the VC
firm by allowing it to raise follow-on funds successfully.214 In summary,
these figures suggest that M&As play a crucial role in the health of the
VC ecosystem, including new VCs.215
This observation is important because many of the first-time
funds launched in the last couple of years focus on inclusion and
diversity.216 Many of these funds are raised by investors of more diverse
backgrounds.217 Moreover, the new cadre of investors makes it their
mission to support founders of diverse backgrounds.218 As a result,
smaller new funds often pursue innovation in sectors or geographies
that have been neglected in the past through their investment
strategies in new products and services that reach under-tapped
communities.219 Taken together, these figures suggest that M&As play
a crucial role in the health of the VC ecosystem.220 This may be
particularly so for first-time funds where the time and ability to execute
a median-sized M&A can unlock the ability to raise a follow-on fund and
further advance diversity and inclusion in the entrepreneurial

212.
See infra Figures 7, 8.
213.
Gary Dushnitsky, Venture Capital: An Ecosystem Under Threat?, LONDON BUS.
SCH. (Nov. 24, 2021) https://www.london.edu/think/iepc-venture-capital-an-ecosystem-underthreat [https://perma.cc/4QFT-RBH2].
214.
Id.
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[https://perma.cc/VAW8-WM52] [hereinafter Competition Laws].
216.
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[https://perma.cc/BRT2-WSVK] (Oct. 21, 2020, 10:15 PM).
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218.
Tweh, supra note 216.
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220.
Gary Dushnitsky & Daniel Sokol, Mergers, Antitrust, and the Interplay of
Entrepreneurial Activity and the Investments that Fund It, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(June 23, 2021) https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/06/23/mergers-antitrust-and-theinterplay-of-entrepreneurial-activity-and-the-investments-that-fund-it [https://perma.cc/27MBUDJT].
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ecosystem.221 Thus, a change in merger law may threaten such diversity
and inclusion efforts.222
Figure 7: Median Fund Size for First-Time VCs and
Median M&A Size223
$150

4.0
3.0

$100

2.0

$50
$0

1.0
06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

Acquisition
1st VC (Avg, incl non-discl)

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

-

1st VC (Median)
Ratio

The X-axis denotes the calendar year.224 The left Y-axis refers to
the bar (VC fund size) and area (M&A size) median dollar amount
($M).225 The right Y-axis and line plot represent the ratio of the latter
to the former.226
Figure 8 below demonstrates that the timing to liquidity for a
venture fund is lower for M&A than other forms of exit.227 A change in
antitrust-merger standards likely would shift this liquidity window
further into the future because of increased antitrust scrutiny.228
Table 3: US VC Median Time (Years) from First VC to Exit by
Type229

221.
Id.
222.
Id.
223.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the
XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “First Financings” and “Median First vs. Follow On” tabs).
Additional analysis and data provided by the authors.
224.
See supra Figure 7.
225.
See supra Figure 7.
226.
See supra Figure 7.
227.
See infra Figure 8.
228.
See, e.g., Figure 8.
229.
See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 103 (select “Download the
XLS Data Pack”; then navigate to the “Exit Medians and Avg” tab).
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Figure 8 Time to a Liquidity Event230

The X-axis denotes the calendar year.231 The Y-axis reports the
number of years (median value) to exit.232
B. Corporate Venture Builders and Walled Gardens
In parallel to the vibrant world of grassroots VC-backed
entrepreneurial ventures, the Authors also witnessed the evolution of
the corporate-venture-builder phenomenon. It includes entities such as
BCG Digital Ventures, which self-describes as “a corporate investment
and incubation firm. . .[that] invent[s], build[s] and invest[s] in startups
with the world’s most influential companies.”233 The latter exemplifies
a growing model whereby incumbent corporations collaborate with a
venture builder to seed and nurture innovations in certain areas
through (one or more) pre-designated ventures to be assimilated within
the incumbent, not through acquisition, but from something short of
acquisition such as an alliance or through contracting.234

230.
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232.
See supra Figure 8.
233.
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Belief,
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DIGIT.
VENTURES,
[https://perma.cc/AR57-HWX5] (last visited June 1, 2021).
234.
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To the extent that incumbents may be precluded or delayed from
accessing the broader universe of entrepreneurial ventures, the
entrepreneurial ecosystem may end up with a set of contractual-based
“walled innovation gardens.”235 One concern is that such an approach
effectively creates these walled gardens where only pre-selected
startups can reach and win incumbents’ attention.236 This runs the risk
of stifling innovation (for incumbents) and can also impact scale-up
opportunities (for startups) and compensation and longevity of the VC
funds that backed them.237 For incumbents, the risk is that they draw
from a limited pool of innovators and, therefore, may miss out on other
or better innovations beyond the focal pool.238 For entrepreneurs, it
implies that many would be unable to scale or sell their companies,
especially if the trade-sale route is blocked.239 Finally, for VC funds, the
shift of incumbents’ resources towards corporate-venture builders can
decrease capital availability and the prospects of future funds in two
ways: first, a decrease in established corporations as an important
source of LPs, and, second, a decrease in M&A activity.240
VIII. CONCLUSION
The world of entrepreneurship is complex. There is a history of
poorly thought-out legal rules which negatively impact business growth
and innovation.241 The proposed change in merger presumptions,
motivated by the increasing number of tech firms, will instead reduce
M&A-exit opportunities for founders and VC investors, decrease the
number of new VC funds founded, and may have a disproportionate
impact on social-based investing relating to sustainability and diversity
that plays a large role in many first-time funds’ investment decisions.242
By limiting the number of companies that can make acquisitions
through a proposed change in merger law, limitations would be placed
on the ability of new ventures to exit.243 It also potentially chills
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incentives for such firms to scale up because they may be punished for
being too successful with such restrictions placed upon them.244 The
tradeoffs for a change in merger laws in terms of reducing
entrepreneurial exits do not merit such a change in the law.

244.
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